This paper attempts to quantify the benefits associated with operating a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM) in Fedwire, the large-value payment system of the Federal Reserve. Calibrating the model of Martin and McAndrews (2008), we find that potential gains are large compared to the likely cost of implementing an LSM, on the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars per day.
Introduction
This paper attempts to quantify the bene…ts from operating a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM) on a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) large-value payment system. Using data from Fedwire, the large-value payment system of the Federal Reserve, we …nd that these gains are large compared to the likely cost of implementing an LSM, on the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars per day. Our paper is the …rst attempt to use data from the payment system operated by a large central bank to estimate the bene…ts of an LSM.
LSMs are queuing arrangements that operate in conjunction with an interbank settlement system. Queued payments are released when some prespeci…ed rule has been satis…ed.
Typically, a payment is released from the queue if the sending bank's balance is above some minimum threshold or if the payment is part of a multilaterally o¤setting group of payments.
TARGET 2, the large-value payment system used in the euro area, already includes an LSM.
The Bank of Japan introduced an LSM in October 2008. The Federal Reserve is studying the bene…ts and costs of implementing an LSM for Fedwire, its large-value payment system. Hence, evaluating the performance of di¤erent LSM designs is an important policy issue.
We calibrate the model of Martin and McAndrews (2008) to quantify the improvement that could be achieved by including a liquidity-saving mechanism in Fedwire. In the model, banks choose whether to make a payment early or late in the day. Sending a payment early increases the risk of incurring an overdraft fee from the central bank. Delaying a payment can be costly because it negatively a¤ects the banks'customers or counterparties.
The di¤erence between the expected cost of sending a payment early and the expected cost of delaying a payment is increasing in the fraction of other banks that delay their payments. Without an LSM, this strategic complementarity creates the possibility of multiple equilibria, including an equilibrium where all banks decide to delay their payments.
We use Fedwire data to calibrate the model. Our data suggest that the size of liquidity shocks on Fedwire is relatively small. The bene…ts of an LSM are large in that region of the parameter space. Hence our calibration suggests that implementing an LSM for Fedwire would have important bene…ts. Indeed, we …nd that the bene…ts of implementing a liquiditysaving mechanism are over $500; 000 per day, in some cases considerably more.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews Martin and McAndrews (2008) and Atalay et al. (2010) . Section 3 describes our calibration and section 4 o¤ers a brief conclusion.
Model Set-up and Results
In this section, we review the main results of Martin and McAndrews (2008) . Section 2.1 describes the model and de…nes the parameters that will be calibrated in section 3. Section 2.2 presents the equilibrium and the socially optimal allocations for the case without an LSM and alternatively when a liquidity-saving mechanism is available. For a more detailed discussion, see Martin and McAndrews (2008) or Atalay et al. (2010) .
Set-up
The model lasts two periods, morning and afternoon. There is a unit mass of banks of equal size. Each bank must make and receive one payment during the day. A fraction 2 [0; 1] of the banks must make a time-critical payment. Banks that delay time-critical payments incur a cost > 0. The remaining 1 banks have a non-time-critical payment that can be delayed at no cost.
Before the beginning of the morning period, banks face a shock to their balances with the central bank. We can think of this liquidity shock as a payment that must be made in the morning and won't be o¤set until the afternoon. A fraction 2 [0;
] of the banks receive a negative liquidity shock of size 1 2 [0;
1 2 ]; a fraction receive a positive liquidity shock of size 1 ; and the remaining 1 2 banks do not receive a liquidity shock. So, banks can be one of six types. They can have a positive, a negative, or no liquidity shock.
Furthermore, independent of the liquidity shock, banks can have a time-critical payment or a payment that can be delayed without cost.
Banks that have a negative balance at the end of the morning period must pay an overdraft fee R > 0 on their balances. Banks with a positive position do not earn any interest on their balances and cannot loan their excess funds to other banks. 1 Banks decide whether to delay or send their payments early by comparing the expected costs of each 1 There is no market for intraday reserves. See Martin and McAndrews (2010) for a discussion. 
Afternoon period
All remaining payments made Figure 1 : Timeline for shocks and for sending and receiving payments.
option, while forming rational expectations about the probability of receiving a payment in the morning.
If an LSM is present, banks have a third option. They can choose to send their payments to a queue, which will release the payment provided that doing so does not cause the bank to incur an overdraft. The number of payments that are released from the queue depends on the underlying pattern of payments. For this paper, we assume that the payments form one cycle (i.e., bank A's payment is destined for bank B; bank B's payment is for bank C; ::::; bank Y 's payment is for bank Z and bank Z's payment is for bank A): This assumption on the pattern of payments generates the smallest number of queued payments that are released. In this way, we are providing a lower bound on the bene…t that can be realized by a liquidity-saving mechanism.
To review, Figure 1 , from Atalay et al. (2010) , describes the timing of events in the model.
Results

Without a liquidity-saving mechanism
In equilibrium, banks with a non-time-critical payment always choose to delay their payment, because the expected cost of delay is 0 and the expected cost of sending early is positive.
Depending on the parameters of the model, some subset of the banks with a time-critical payment may delay or send their payment early. We might expect that the fraction of banks that delay is decreasing in R ; the ratio of the cost of delay to the cost of borrowing from the central bank, but things are not so simple. Because banks form beliefs about the probability of receiving a payment in the morning period, the equilibrium also depends on the fraction of banks that have a liquidity shock and the fraction of banks with a time-critical payment.
In some regions of the parameter space, multiple equilibria can coexist.
For future reference, it is useful to describe the e¢ cient timing of payment submission, the timing that would be chosen by a social planner. The planner tries to minimize the sum of the delay costs and overdraft fees incurred by the banks and has the ability to instruct banks of a speci…c type to send or delay their payments. The planner knows the distribution of bank types in the economy, but does not know the speci…c type of the receiving bank when it instructs a bank to send or delay a payment.
Depending on the parameter values, the social planner chooses one of three payment patterns: (1) all banks pay early, (2) only banks with a negative liquidity shock and a non-time-critical payment delay, and (3) only banks with a negative liquidity shock delay.
For most of the values of the parameters, the planner chooses to have all banks send their payments early. Only when is close to 1 2 does the planner want banks with a negative liquidity shock to delay their payments. The planner does so in cases of a large enough gain arising from banks with a negative liquidity shock receiving a payment from a bank with a positive liquidity shock.
Below, we describe the equilibrium and the planner's allocations. Table 1 gives the possible actions of the six di¤erent types of banks, for the equilibrium and the planner's allocations. Figure 2 illustrates these allocations for a given range of parameter values. The table and …gure also appear in Atalay et al. (2010) . In the table, f+; 0; g is used to
classify banks according to their liquidity shock, while s is for banks with a time-sensitive payment and r is for banks with a non-time-sensitive payment. Banks can either send their payment early (E) or delay (D): As can be seen from Table 1 , the planner's allocation and the equilibrium allocation never coincide. 
With a liquidity-saving mechanism
With a liquidity-saving mechanism, banks have the option to submit their payments to a queue, in addition to delaying or sending their payments early. A queued payment will be released in the morning period if and only if the sending bank receives an o¤setting payment in the morning. Martin and McAndrews (2008) show that there are four possible equilibria, displayed in Table 2 and Figure 3 . The social planner's allocations are given in the …nal four rows of the table. queue, a bank that delays cannot receive a payment, since the payment that the bank would receive cannot be released from the queue. As suggested by Table 2 , there are parameter con…gurations for which the equilibrium allocation corresponds to the planner's allocation.
For these parameters, all payments are settled in the morning.
There are also regions of the parameter space where the equilibrium allocation with an LSM does not correspond to the planner's allocation. Even for these parameters, however, adopting an LSM can reduce banks' expected costs. In the next section, we calibrate our model using data from Fedwire to …nd an estimate of the bene…ts from adopting an LSM.
Calibrating the Model Using Data from Fedwire
In this section, we use Fedwire data to calibrate the equilibrium of the model described in section 2, with and without an LSM. We will …rst describe our data and then calibrate values for and : With values for and in hand, we can make a …rst comparison between the welfare under an RTGS system with and without an LSM. Next, we calibrate values for ; R;
and , which allows us to put a dollar …gure on the welfare improvement of an LSM relative to a pure RTGS system.
The expression for the aggregate welfare cost incurred by banks that participate in the payment system is given by equation ( The parameters of the model ; R; ; ; and , are de…ned as in section 2. The probability that a payment is received in the morning period is given by : To get a dollar …gure, we multiple W by 4:31 trillion, which is the average daily turnover for Fedwire Funds and Fedwire securities over the sample period.
( 1 2 ) [(
The data
The Fedwire Funds Service is a RTGS system owned and operated by the Federal Reserve. In the …rst and second quarters of 2007, approximately 534; 000 payments worth $2:48 trillion were sent each day via Fedwire Funds. For this calibration exercise, we use a transactionlevel dataset that includes the identity of the sending and receiving institutions, the size of each transaction, the time at which the transactions are settled over Fedwire Funds, and a variable that di¤erentiates transactions between overnight money-market deliveries, returns of overnight money-market loans, settlement transactions, third-party transactions, and interbank transactions.
We associate the liquidity shock with the net of payments made to, and received from, three settlement systems: CHIPS, CLS, and DTC. Each of these settlement systems maintains accounts with the Federal Reserve and may send and receive funds using Fedwire Funds.
We also include the payment side of securities transactions made through the Fedwire Securities Service as part of the liquidity shock. These transfers are usually initiated by the seller of the security and represent a large part of the daylight overdrafts of some banks. None of these payments can be delayed and thus …t well with our idea of the liquidity shock.
2 CHIPS is a privately owned payment system that processes payments worth approximately $1:82 trillion each day. At the beginning of the day, banks send funds from their account at the Federal Reserve to CHIPS. These funds are used for the banks'activity in CHIPS. Near the end of the day, shortly after 5:00 PM, banks will either need to send additional funds from their Federal Reserve account to CHIPS or will receive funds from CHIPS.
CLS Bank is an industry-owned payment system that settles foreign exchange transactions, worth $3:41 trillion during the average day of our sample period. Its hours of operation are 1:00 AM to 6:00 AM.
DTC is a securities settlement system, settling transactions worth almost $900 billion each day. As with CHIPS, banks may need to send intraday progress payments to DTC. The Fedwire Securities Service, also owned and operated by the Federal Reserve, is a delivery-versus-payment securities settlement system. In the …rst and second quarters of 2007, the average daily cash value of the transactions over Fedwire Securities was approximately $1:8 trillion. We include the cash side of securities transactions made before 12:00 PM in our calculation of the morning liquidity shock. More than 60 percent of the cash value of the day's transactions occurred before noon of the average day in the sample period.
Calibrating and
Our …rst objective is to calibrate , the fraction of banks that receive a positive or a negative liquidity shock, and 1 , the size of the shocks. In the model, banks have either a positive shock, a negative shock, or no shock in the morning. In contrast, the distribution of shocks in the data looks much smoother. To determine the fraction of banks that qualify as having received a shock, we look at the distribution of shocks given by the data and select two cuto¤ values. Between these cuto¤s, banks are assigned to the zero-shock group. Above the higher cuto¤, banks are assigned to the positive shock group, and all other banks are assigned to the negative shock group.
Banks may send and receive several payments to and from the settlement institutions.
We think of the bank's liquidity shock as corresponding to the net position resulting from all of these payments. For example, a bank may send a payment to DTC but receive a payment on the Fedwire Securities Service from the sale of a security. Since only the net position a¤ects bank's balances, we use this measure to calibrate 1 .
We need to make two adjustments to ensure that the calibrated liquidity shock is of the appropriate size. First, the size of a bank's shock in the model is a share of all payments made by the bank. It corresponds to the bank's liquidity shock, in absolute value, divided by the sum of the liquidity shock, again in absolute value, and other payments made throughout the day. Thus, we want 1 to be given by 1 = jNet position with settlement institutionsj jNet position with settlement institutionsj + Gross payments throughout the day
The net position of a bank with the settlement institutions is de…ned to be its net position with CHIPS, CLS, DTC, and Fedwire Securities at 12:00 P.M.
The second adjustment has to do with the fact that banks have either a time-critical payment or a non-time-critical payment in our model. In the data, banks have to make many payments of each type. Theory shows that banks always delay non-time-critical payments in an RTGS system. When considering whether to make a time-critical payment early, banks compare the cost of delay with the cost of borrowing. To get this margin right, we believe that only time-critical payments should be considered in the second term of the denominator of 1 , in equation (2). Hence, our calibrated value for will depend on the payments we classify as time critical. If we classify more payments as non-time critical, the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (2) will decrease and our calibrated value for will decrease as well.
Since we cannot directly observe which payments are time critical, we need to make an assumption concerning the categories of payments that are time critical. In our model, only non-time-critical payments are always delayed. In the data, only deliveries of overnight money-market loans are always made late in the day; 93 percent of these transactions are settled after 2:30 P.M. 3 Other types of transactions occur both early and late in the day.
Transactions made on behalf of a third party are settled, on average, earliest in the day. To capture the range of reasonable values of , we will consider two cases for our calibration.
The case where only deliveries of money-market loans are non-time critical will yield a high value for , and the case where all but third-party transactions are non-time critical will yield a low value for .
In Figure 4 , we draw the distribution of shocks across banks, under the assumption that only deliveries of overnight money-market loans are non-time critical. As can be seen in that …gure, a few large banks receive securities over the Fedwire Securities Service every morning.
These banks consistently incur a small negative shock on their balances. Conversely, a large number of smaller banks send securities and thus enjoy a positive liquidity shock. In our model, the aggregate shock is zero in both the morning and the afternoon periods. Unlike in our model, the distribution of actual shocks is not symmetric around zero. More banks send, rather than receive, payments to the settlement institutions in the morning. The di¤erence between the model and the data is partially o¤set by the fact that banks hold positive reserves at their account with the Federal Reserve, while in our model we have normalized the banks'starting balances to be zero. Banks hold positive balances to meet requirements and because they anticipate morning pay-ins to CHIPS and DTC.
As noted previously, we need to select cuto¤s to assign banks into positive shock, negative shock, and no-shock groups. We choose the mean of the right-hand side of the shock distribution to serve as our cuto¤ between positive and zero-shock banks. The overall average shock is represented by the middle vertical line in Figure 4 at 0:5 percent. Because the shock in our model is symmetric, we focus on one side of the distribution and extrapolate.
We choose the right-hand side of the distribution, because small changes in the cuto¤ will have only minor e¤ects on our calibration of the shock. 4 The mean of the right-hand side of the distribution is 8:8 percent, which gives a calibrated value for 1 of 9:3 percent.
Thirteen percent of the banks have a shock greater than 0:088. Thus, our calibration of is 0:13. To have a symmetric shock, the cuto¤ for a negative liquidity shock must be set at 8:5 percent. This is slightly less than the mean of the left-hand side of the distribution, which is 7:2 percent.
As expected, the calibrated value for decreases as we classify more payments as nontime critical. If we classify only third-party transactions as time critical, the mean shock, given by equation (2), is 1:0 percent. The mean value of the right-hand side of the distribution of shocks is 16:5 percent, resulting in 82:5 percent as our calibrated value of (since 1 = 17:5 percent). Seventeen percent of the banks have a shock that is greater than 0:165, giving us a calibrated value of 0:17 for : Figure 4 : Distribution of shocks. The three vertical lines give the mean shock of the lefthand side of the distribution, the mean shock, and the mean shock of the right-hand side of the distribution.
Since is greater than 2 3
; welfare under an LSM will be at least as high as under an RTGS system (see proof of proposition 10 of Martin and McAndrews 2008 can coexist when a liquidity-saving mechanism is not present. When computing the aggregate cost under RTGS, we consider the equilibria that have the most payments settle early. This will imply that our measure is a lower bound for the improvement generated by a liquiditysaving mechanism. Over this grid, the median value of is 3:13. For more than 90 percent of the parameter combinations, is greater than 1:45.
The planner always chooses to have all payments sent early for greater than . For the same set of parameter values for , , R , and , the ratio Aggregate cost under RTGS Aggregate cost under a planner's solution has a median value of 8:27 and is always at least 1:0625.
To go further and provide an estimate of the bene…ts of an LSM in dollar terms, we need to calibrate ; ; and R. We do this in the remainder of this section. When calibrating these parameters, we again consider the case where only money-market deliveries are classi…ed as non-time-critical payments and the case where deliveries on overnight money-market loans, returns on overnight money-market loans, and interbank transactions are non-time-critical payments. 5 We choose 2 f0:80; 0:805; :::0:945g and 2 f0:10; 0:11; :::; 0:20g. 6 We let R 2 f0:10; 0:13::::3:10g and 2 f0:025; 0:075; :::0:975g.
Calibrating
Our …rst step is to calibrate . In our model, each bank must make either one time-critical or one non-time-critical payment. The fraction of banks that must make a time-critical payment is . Since, in the data, banks make both time-critical and non-time-critical payments, we use an indirect strategy to obtain a value for . We exploit the fact that the amount of reserves borrowed in the model depends only on and , which we have already calibrated, and on . We choose so that the average amount borrowed in Fedwire is consistent with the amount predicted by our model, given the calibrated values for and .
The amount of borrowing in the model depends on which equilibrium is played. Martin and McAndrews (2008) show that four types of equilibria can occur in an RTGS system: (1) All time-critical payments are delayed, (2) only banks with a positive liquidity shock make their time-critical payments early, (3) banks with a positive liquidity shock and banks with no liquidity shock make their time-critical payments early, and (4) all time-critical payments are made early. Given a calibrated value of between 0:13 and 0:17, we should observe that the fraction of time-critical payments that are delayed is 0 percent, 13 17 percent, 83 87 percent, or 100 percent, depending on the type of equilibrium.
Looking at the data, we see that the fraction of payments delayed depends on when we choose the cuto¤ between morning and afternoon. If we choose the cuto¤ time to be noon and assume that only deliveries of overnight money-market loans are non-time critical, then 82 percent of the time critical payments in our model are delayed. This number would drop to 72 percent if the cuto¤ were 2:00 P.M. We get similar values (81 percent for noon and 68 percent for 2:00 P.M.) when only transactions made on behalf of a third-party are classi…ed as time-critical. In either case, we conclude that Fedwire is in an equilibrium in which only banks that receive a positive liquidity shock make their time-critical payments early. All other payments are delayed.
In this equilibrium, theory indicates that the total borrowed from the central bank is equal to (2 1)(1 ) + (1 )(1 ). This expression corresponds to the share of banks with a time-critical payment and positive liquidity shock, , multiplied by the amount these banks have to borrow if they do not receive a payment in the morning, 2 1, multiplied by the probability that they will not receive a payment in the morning, 1 , plus the share of banks with a negative liquidity shock, , that do not receive a payment in the morning, 1 , and must borrow 1 .
In the …rst two quarters of 2007, the average daily amount paid in overdraft fees was $508; 000 per day. Hence, the number of overdraft hours is 1:219 trillion on the average day.
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We know that the average overdraft was three hours and 59 minutes in the …rst half of 2007,
implying that approximately $305 billion was borrowed each day from the Federal Reserve during this period. This amount represents 7:1 percent of the $4:31 trillion sent each day.
Setting (2 1)(1 ) + (1 )(1 ) equal to 0:071 gives us combinations of ; ;
and , which are consistent with our model. These values are plotted in Figure 5 . We also plot the two ( ; ) pairs calibrated in the previous subsection. In summary, Figure 5 shows that values of in the range ( ) are consistent with the values of and that were calibrated in section 3.2.
Calibrating and R
Using the calibrated values of , , and , we can calibrate R , the ratio of the cost of delay to the daylight overdraft fee. Then, to complete our calibration, we calibrate R based on the overdraft fee paid by banks. Our strategy is to choose a value of R such that the timing of settlement given by the model is consistent with the timing of settlement in the data. In our model, all non-time-critical payments are delayed. Banks will choose to send or delay time-critical payments depending on the magnitude of R and on their liquidity shock.
If only banks with a positive liquidity shock make their time-critical payments early, as we argued in the previous subsection, then we must have ( Our results indicate that the calibrated bene…ts of using an LSM can vary from approximately $500; 000 a day to more than $2 million a day, depending on the calibration. We can compare this bene…t to the estimated cost the ECB planned to charge the users of TARGET 2 for its liquidity-pooling features. The annual cost is estimated at Euro 900; 000 (ECB 2005). Hence, even for the calibrations that yield relatively small bene…ts from using an LSM, these bene…ts appear large compared to the cost.
The calibration exercise reveals another interesting fact: The cost of borrowing from the central banks can be small compared to the cost imposed by delay. For example, with parameters set to R = 6, R = 0:79, = 0:90, = 0:13, and = 0:60, as above, the borrowing cost makes up only approximately 18 percent($508; 000 / $2:88 million) of the total costs of participating in the payment system. Hence, considering only the cost of borrowing can substantially underestimate the actual cost of using the payment system.
Discussion
What determines the size of the improvements associated with implementing a liquiditysaving mechanism? The total cost incurred by banks in participating in the large-value system consists of two components. First, banks pay overdraft fees to the central bank. We can easily take this component of the total welfare cost from existing data. As mentioned above, the Federal Reserve collects roughly $500,000 per day in overdraft fees. The second component, delay costs, is impossible to observe directly. Here, we rely on our model to get a sense of how large aggregate delay costs are, relative to overdraft costs. Banks both delay and send some of their payments early. In 2006, 50 percent of the value of Fedwire activity was settled after 4:15 P.M., two hours and …fteen minutes before Fedwire closes (Armantier et al. 2008) . From the observed distribution of payment settlement times, we make the following conclusions. First, there are many payments for which delay costs are incurred.
Second, we are able to restrict the ratio of the cost of delaying a payment to the cost of borrowing from the central bank. Given our model, we calibrated that the cost of delaying a payment is somewhere between 60 percent to 85 percent of the cost of borrowing from the central bank. Furthermore, given the distribution of payment settlement times, we see that banks do, indeed, delay a large fraction of their payments. Putting the last two sentences together, we conclude that the aggregate delay costs incurred by banks is on the same order of magnitude or larger than the aggregate welfare costs associated with overdraft fees.
When a liquidity-saving mechanism is introduced, as long as the liquidity shock is not too large (1 < 1 3
) the only banks that delay their payments outright are those with a negative liquidity shock and non-time-critical payments. All other banks either queue or send their payments early. This has two e¤ects. First, as fewer banks with a positive or zero liquidity shock delay their payments, liquidity is transferred from banks with positive and zero liquidity shock to banks with negative liquidity shock, causing a reduction in aggregate overdraft fees. Second, by examining Table 2 and Figure 3 , we see that, for most parameter combinations, all time-critical payments are released in the morning, driving aggregate delay costs to zero. There are some parameter combinations-those associated with equilibrium #3 in Figure 3 -where zero-and-negative-liquidity-shock banks with a time-critical payment queue, rather than send their payment outright. As long as the fraction of banks with a non-time-critical payment is not too large, a large fraction of these queued payments will be released in the morning. 8 So, introducing a liquidity-saving mechanism either eliminates aggregate delay costs or, if the fraction of banks with a time-critical payment is not too small, reduces the size of aggregate delay costs by a considerable amount. To sum up the argument of this paragraph and the one before, the bene…ts of an LSM are on the same order of magnitude as the aggregate amount paid in delay costs, which are as large or larger than the aggregate amount paid in overdraft fees to the central bank, $500,000 per day. The key ingredients to these conclusions were that R is not too close to zero, the fraction of banks with a time-critical payment is not too small ( is not too close to zero), and the liquidity shock is not too large ( > 2 3
):
There are two possible ways in which our calibrated value of the aggregate welfare im-provement may di¤er from the actual bene…t accrued by the Federal Reserve. On the one hand, our calibrated value may overstate the bene…t of a liquidity-saving mechanism. In our model, all payment orders occur at the beginning of the day. In reality, this may not be the case. So, what we capture in our calibration as a delayed payment may actually be a payment order occurring later in the day. Since we are overstating the calibration of the value of payments delayed in an RTGS, we are also overstating the bene…t of an LSM. On the other hand, our calibrated value may understate the bene…t to the Federal Reserve of implementing an LSM. Above, we calibrate only the bene…t of an LSM to payment system participants. However, the Federal Reserve has an additional interest in moving payments away from the very end of the day because of concerns over operational risks. These bene…ts of a more robust payment system would also be broadly shared by participants.
Sensitivity analysis
We have already seen that, depending on which payments are classi…ed as time critical, our calibrated value of 1 can vary by a factor of two and our calibrated bene…ts vary from over $2 million per day to roughly $500; 000 per day. In addition, we have allowed to vary over a wide interval, showing that changes in the fraction of banks with a time-critical payment do not materially a¤ect the calibrated gains from a liquidity-saving mechanism. In this section, we discuss three additional robustness checks. These three scenarios will a¤ect our calibrated values of and . Changing and will cause our calibrated values of and R to change as well, as the calibration of these two parameters involves calculations in terms of and . The robustness checks con…rm that there are large bene…ts to implementing an LSM.
Below, we consider how robust the calibrated results are to:
changing the cuto¤ between banks that receive a positive liquidity shock and those that receive a zero liquidity shock. In the original calibration, we set the cuto¤ to be the mean of the right-hand side of the distribution of shocks.
changing the cuto¤ between the morning and afternoon periods. In the original cali-bration, we set the cuto¤ to be noon.
changing the sample period. Armantier et al. (2008) …nd that, on certain days, payments are settled on Fedwire signi…cantly earlier. In particular, on days before or after a holiday, on the last day of the quarter, on the …rst day of the month, or on the 15th or 25th of the month 9 the median payment is settled 10-20 minutes earlier.
The results of the robustness exercises are summarized in In the …rst three rows, we describe the e¤ect of changing the cuto¤ between positiveliquidity-shock banks and zero-liquidity-shock banks. We can visualize this changing cuto¤ as moving the right-most vertical line in Figure 4 to the left or right. Shifting the cuto¤ to the right mechanically increases and : Remember that we calibrated using the following equation describing the amount paid in overdraft fees to the central bank: (2 1)(1 )+
(1 )(1 ) = 0:071: A higher implies a lower calibrated value for : The calibrated fraction of time-critical payments can vary considerably, increasing above 0:95 when is small. Increasing the cuto¤ between banks with positive and banks with zero liquidity shock increases the calibrated welfare improvement of a liquidity-saving mechanism, mainly because the calibrated fraction of payments that are classi…ed as time critical (and thus subject to a delay cost) has increased. Decreasing the cuto¤ also increases the calibrated welfare improvement, but for a di¤erent reason. When we set the cuto¤ to be 1 2 times the mean of the right-hand-side of the shock distribution, the other calibrated parameters imply that, in equilibrium with a liquidity-saving mechanism, all payments are settled in the morning period. In this part of the parameter space, shifting all payments to the morning period leads to a large welfare improvement.
In the fourth, …fth, and sixth rows of Table 3 , we describe the e¤ect of changing the cuto¤ time between the morning and afternoon periods. Shifting the cuto¤ to later in the day leads to a lower and a higher : Having a larger calibrated fraction of time-critical payments implies that the welfare gains will be larger.
In the …nal two rows, we examine whether our results are sensitive to the sample of days that we used. The parameter values do not change when we restrict the sample to days that, according to Armantier et al. (2008) , have earlier-than-average settlement of payments. Table 3 : Results from the robustness exercises. The …rst three rows display the e¤ect of changing the cuto¤ between banks that receive a positive versus zero liquidity shock. The second three lines consider the e¤ect of changing the cuto¤ between morning and afternoon periods. The last two rows consider the e¤ect of changing the sample period. In the "LSM Equilibria" column, the number 1 indicates that all payments are settled early and the number 3 indicates that s+ banks pay early, r-banks delay, and all other banks queue their payments.
The sensitivity analysis we have performed in this section implies that our original estimate of the potential gains of a liquidity-saving mechanism may be on the conservative side. There is still reason to be cautious, however, as the calibrated values for ; R and the welfare gains do vary considerably.
Conclusion
Our calibration is the …rst attempt to use data to evaluate the potential impact of an LSM.
We use Fedwire data to calibrate the parameters of our model. We then use these calibrated parameters to determine what an equilibrium would look like with an LSM. By comparing the two equilibria, we can derive the potential bene…t from adopting an LSM. Our results suggest that the bene…ts of an LSM can be signi…cant. In particular, we …nd that even with the calibration that assigns the smallest bene…t from using an LSM, it would take only a few days to make up the …xed cost of setting up such a system. Our calibration also shows that the observed cost of borrowing can be small compared to the overall cost of using the payment system.
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